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Case Comment
of the land, (2) that when things are found on land with a manifest
intention to control, then there is a presumption that the occupier has
possession of the article, but that this presumption may be rebutted.
In the Grafstein case we were not concerned with things attached
to land and we were never told whether the presumption was applied.
Grafstein received the money because at the time the money (not the
box) was discovered, he had de facto possession since Holme turned
the box over to him two years earlier and Grafstein was under a legal
obligation to the true owner. When dealing with a claim for lost pro-
perty found on land, perhaps the fact that one party is the occupier
of land is not as important as it was before. Grafstein v. Holme &
Freeman indicates that custody of the article and an obligation to the
true owner are the tests and the mere occupation of the land on which
the article was found may only be a factor to be considered with other
facts in determining who had custody of the article.
GERALD J. MORRIS
UNITED MOTORS SERVICE INC. v. HUTSON ET AL.-LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT-NEGLIGENCE-LESSOR'S OBLIGATION TO INSURE-LESSEE'S Li-
BiLITY-LESSOR'S RIGHTS-The decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in United Motor Service Inc. v. Hutson et al.1 has recently
gained attention as a result of the Ontario decision in Shell Oil Co. of
Canada Ltd. v. The White Motor Co. Ltd.2 Before analysing the prob-
lems posed by this judgment, it is intended to summarise the law on
the subject down to the instant case.
At common law, lessees for years were not liable for accidental
or negligent burning of demised premises. The Statutes of Marle-
bridge and Gloucester, however, rendered tenants liable for waste. In
Yellowly v. Gower,3 it was held that the liability included permissive
as well as voluntary waste. The Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 137 stated in section 31: Lessees making or suffer-
ing waste in the demised premises without licence of the lessors shall
be liable for the full damage so occasioned.
In the Accidental Fires Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 146, the following
provision is to be noted: No action shall be brought against any per-
son in whose house or building or on whose land any fire shall acci-
dentally begin, nor shall any recompense be made by him for any
damage suffered thereby; but no contract or agreement made between
landlord and tenant shall be hereby defeated or made void. This
statute is based on 6 Anne, c. 131 and 14 Geo. III c. 78. It was
decided in 1847 in Filliter v. Phippard4 that the exemption "fire shall
accidentally begin" did not include a fire caused by the tenant's negli-
gence. This decision has never been doubted in Britain or Canada,
* Mr. Morris is presently enrolled in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law
School.1 [19371 S.C.R. 294.
2 [1957] O.W.N. 229.
3 (1855), 11 Ex. 274.
4 (1847), 11 Q.B. 347.
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and it has been affirmed in two Canadian cases, Canada Southern
Railway Oo. v. Phelps5 and Port Coquirlam v. Wilson.6 The Ontario
case of Moriss v. Cairncross7 affirmed that a tenant for years is liable
for damages caused by negligence.
With this background in mind, the Hutson case can now be
examined. The facts were these: United Motors Service leased a
garage from Hutson. The following provisions appeared in the lease:
"And the said Lessor covenants to pay all taxes in connection with the
demised premises and all premiums of insurance upon the buildings
erected thereon. And the said Lessor will repair, according to notice in
writing, reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire, lightning and
tempest, riot or public disorder or act of any governmental authority only
excepted. And that it will leave the premises in good repair, reasonable
wear and tear and damage by fire, lightning and tempest only ex-
cepted".
Employees of the garage company were cleaning the floor with
gasoline and Oakite, which, according to the evidence, was a normal
way of cleaning garage floors. The Oakite had to be applied hot, there
being a tank heated by gas jets for this purpose. A metal scraper was
being used to remove sticky material when suddenly the floor burst
into flames. Much damage occurred. The tenant was sued by the
landlord and by the insurance companies which had indemnified the
former for his loss. A unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the principal of res ipsa loquitur.
The case and statute law cited previously formed the basis of the
judgment of Kerwin J., with whom Rinfret and Crocket JJ. agreed.
The first difficulty with the decision is that the landlord is ap-
parently compensated twice, although he paid an undetermined amount
to the insurance companies. The second difficulty concerns the plight
of tenants who presume that they are covered by fire insurance: they
cannot insure because the building cannot be insured many times
over. Yet their rent pays the insurance while not releasing them
from liability. The Supreme Court, however, had no choice on the
basis of the previous decisions, so no quarrel can be joined with the
reasoning of the Judges.
The present problem was emphasized in the recent Ontario case
Shell v. White.8 Here, the landlord was suing for damages resulting
from a fire which the court found was caused 'by the lessee's negli-
gence. The lease provided that the lessor pay all insurance premiums
on the premises and that in the event of any business being conducted
on the premises "which will cause the rate of insurance to be raised
on the said premises, the lessee will compensate the Lessor for any
extra premium of insurance thereby required." Kelly, J. found for
the plaintiff on the basis of Hutson. The tenants obviously were
amazed at having to pay damages when they were, in effect, paying
5 (1884), 14 S.C.R. 132.
6 [1923] S.C.R. 235.
714 O.L.R. 544.
8 [1957] O.W.N. 229.
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the insurance premiums. No distinction was drawn between "gross"
and "ordinary" negligence.
The effect of these cases is that a tenant in an apartment build-
ing who forgets to snuff out a digarett properly, thus consuming the
whole building in a conflagration, is liable for the damage caused,
even though the landlord is fully covered by insurance. The Hutson
Case establishes liability for damages to premises occupied by the
tenant. The law establishes a strict liability on the occupier for fire
escaping, as is pointed out by Holdsworth: 9
"The Law imposed a duty upon all householders to keep their fires fromdamaging their neighbours. Hence if a fire arose in a house by the act
of any of the servants or guests, and damage was caused to the house others, t owner was liable. He could only e cape from liability if
he could show that the fire had originated from the act of a stranger.A stranger is a person not of one's household who acts against a house-holder's will. Chief Justice Holt included an Act of God as a defence."The lav is severe with tenants who cause fires.
This was reasonable when, as in the days of Fieiter v. Phifpard °
landlords suffered real losses. It was natural that, when someone
occasioned fire, he should bear the consequences. The development
of fire insurance, however, has changed this and the fact that tenants
generally are ignorant that the "insurance" mentioned in the lease
protects only the landlord shows that the law is not known generally.
It is instructive to compare this attitude, rooted as it is in ancient
English notions of property, to the American viewpoint. Recent judg-
ments there have settled the law in a way that Anglo-Canadian courts
probably would not accept.
In the 956 cee of Any-Pichas v. C. 1,. Jan Co., the circum-
stances were exactly the same as in the Shell case' 2 but the Supreme
Court of Illinois saw it differently. The court stated that the lessee
can relieve himself of liability from negligence by contract. The
Supreme Court of the United Sates had held in Santa Fe, Prescott and
Phoeni Railway v. Grant Bros. Construction Co.i3 that such an agree-
ment was valid and did not offend public policy. In Slocum v). NaturalProducts Co., 4 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the lessee
is fully freed of all contracted liability by the clause "lessee will turn
over the premises in good condition and repair (loss by fire and ordin-
ary wear excepted) ". The Court pointed out that "under the construc-
tion urged by the lessor, it would be necessary for both parties to carry
insurance if they are to be protected." In Loth rap v. Thayer, 5 an-
other Massachusetts case, it is stated that: "The Ancient law has been
acquiesced in, and consciously or unconsciously, the cost of insurance
to the landlord, or the value of the risk, enters into the amount of the
rent".
9 History of English Law, III, 309.
10 (1847), 11 Q.]B. 347.
11 131 N .E. (2d) 100.
i2 ante footnote 2.
13 33 S. Ct. 474.4292 Mass 445; 198 N.E. 747.
1o138 Mass 466 at p. 475.
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The leading American case is General Mills v. Goldman,16 a
decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The court observed: 17 "They(the parties) necessarily consciously figured on the rentals to be paid
by the tenant as the source of the insurance premiums and intended
that the cost of the insurance was to come from the tenants. On practi-
cal effect, the tenants paid the cost of the fire insurance". In a 1956
Ohio case' 8 there are some interesting observations on the rights of
subrogation of fire insurance companies which clash dissonantly with
the Views of Kelly J. in She:' 9
'It is elementary that the rights of the insurers (against the defendant)
cannot rise higher than the rights of the Lessor, since the insurers, as
subrogees, in contemplation of law stand in the place of the Lessor".
The Court goes on to suggest principles of construction of leases:
"What did the parties to the lease have in mind in the use of the ex-
pression 'loss by fire . . . excepted'? . .. Mr. Justice Holmes said in an
earlier case: 'Business contracts must be construed with business sense,
as they would naturally be understood by intelligent men of affairs' ...
Now the phrase 'loss by fire' has a universally recognized connotation
when used in a fire insurance policy. The usual and ordinary meaning
therein is the damage resulting from a fire caused by an act of God or
accidently or negligently, by the hand of man. The person who insures his
property against damage by fire knows that he is covered for any loss
by fire, regardless of the causation, deliberate purpose excepted. That
is common knowledge."
The writer's sole disagreement with this forthright statement is
that such ideas are "common knowledge". Can it be that the only
place where they are unknown is in the courts of Great Britain and
Canada.
Filliter v. Phippard20 effectively emasculated The Accidental Fires
Act, and this principle is so rooted in High Court decisions here and in
England that there is no possibility of distinguishing the cases. The
only manner in which the law can be revised is through legislation.
The writer suggests that a new clause be added to the Short Form of
Leases Act, to the following effect:
The Lessor covenants that the Lessee will be held safe from all actions
with respect to fires caused on the demised premises by the Lessee, his
agents, guests, or invitees arising from any act or omission whatever,
deliberate damage alone excepted.
In many respects the law has come a long way since Anatole France
remarked, "The law, in its magnificent equality, forbids the rich as
well as the poor, to beg in the streets, to sleep under bridges and to
steal bread." The suggested revision, it is submitted, will remove
one of the last vestiges of old attitudes no longer in keeping with
public ideas about Justice.
DONALD COCK *
Mr. Cock is presently enrolled in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law
School.
16 8 Circ. 184 F. 2d 359.
17 Ibid., at p. 366.
Is U.S. Fire Insurance Corp. v. Phil-Mar Corp. 131 N.E. (2d) 445.
19 [1957J O.W.N. at p. 230.
20 (1847), 11 Q.B. 347.
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